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HOW RADICAL IS LIBERALISM? 
Virginia L. Warren* 
JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY. By James s. 
Fishkin. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1983. Pp. 
vii, 200. Cloth, $18.95; paper, $8.95. 
For some years, American liberals have recognized a need to 
reevaluate those policies of theirs that were designed to achieve so-
cial justice - because some of the Great Society programs were less 
successful than others, and also because citizens have become in-
creasingly reluctant to finance social programs through their taxes. 
Published just in time to be read before the 1984 presidential elec-
tion, James Fishkin's Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family ex-
amines the liberal's vision of a just society and finds it wanting. 
Fishkin is a liberal 1 who finds inconsistency at the very core of liber-
alism. He seeks to establish that this conflict among liberal princi-
ples is not only a practical problem in the world as we find it, but a 
problem for "ideal theory" as well, that is, a conflict that would arise 
even if conditions in the world were as good as reasonably could be 
expected. His aim 
is not to discredit liberal theory but only to emphasize that a more 
adequate version of liberalism must face certain hard choices that 
have, heretofore, been glossed over. This book is an effort to chart the 
terrain for such a reformulation. [P. 158]. 
He concludes that liberals must qualify their claims and make those 
difficult decisions. If liberals address this challenge, then, in the fu-
ture, liberal theory might provide more concrete guidance for politi-
cians, and liberal policies might appeal to a wider segment of the 
population. 
While Fishkin teaches in a department of political science, his 
doctorate is in philosophy. His book is analytical and theoretical, 
and is written with the utmost clarity. All the logically possible al-
ternatives to a problem are crisply laid out, and he is always careful 
to keep the reader aware of the overall structure of his argument 
(although sometimes he repeats himself more often than clarity re-
quires). Fishkin has read widely (with a few possible exceptions to 
• Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Chapman College, Orange, California. B.A. 1969, 
Vassar College; M.A. 1970, Ph.D. 1979, University of Michigan. - Ed. 
I. He writes, for example: "We need to continue, indeed to expand, the Great Society's 
wave of experimentation with efforts to improve the developmental conditions of the least 
advantaged." P. 147. 
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be noted below) in political science, political philosophy, and related 
fields, and his footnotes off er an extensive annotated bibliography 
that would be extremely useful for anyone desiring an overview of 
recent political theory. Although the book concentrates on the issue 
of securing equal job opportunities, Fishkin also reflects on the 
broader implications for liberalism in the areas of equal access to the 
political, legal, and health care systems. He thus offers a comprehen-
sive critique of the liberal view of social justice. 
I. FISHKIN'S .ARGUMENT 
Fishkin offers us "a new variation on an old theme: the conflicts 
between liberty and equality'' (p. 2). (As we will see shortly, he 
thinks that his variation is new - and surprising.) Equality, in 
Fishkin's variation, refers to equal job opportunities and resolves 
into two components - the principle of merit and equality of ltfe 
chances. Liberty refers to the autonomy of the family. Fishkin finds 
these three principles to be in irreconcilable conflict, forming a 
trilemma, wherein "commitment to any two of these assumptions 
rules out the third" (p. 5). He claims, in other words, that it is impos-
sible to adhere fully to all three commitments simultaneously; at 
least one principle will always have to be sacrificed or 
compromised.2 
The main ''trilemma" of the book consists of "two central liberal 
asssumptions about equal opportunity, on the one hand, and our 
common moral assumptions about the family, on the other" (p. 4). 
According to the first element of the liberal conception of equal op-
portunity, the principle of merit, 
there should be widespread procedural fairness in the evaluation of 
qualifications for positions. No discrimination should be permitted on 
the basis of race, sex, class, ethnic origin, or other irrelevant character-
istics. [P. 4]. 
The merit principle requires that selection among candidates for jobs 
( or for admission to college or graduate school, given that higher 
education is a prerequisite for many jobs) is to be based on qualifica-
tions that are directly related to job (or school) performance. Ensur-
ing that criteria for hiring (or admissions) are insulated from 
prejudices and from preferences that are idiosyncratic or self-inter-
ested will eliminate one source of unfairness. However, a competi-
tion based on merit - one which is fairly conducted in the present 
- can still be considered unfair if some individuals have previously 
2. Fishkin is investigating the consequences of fully realizing, in practical terms, one's 
moral principles. His project here is similar to that of another recent book of his. In THE 
LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982) he found that co=only held assumptions about the nature of 
moral obligations conflict with a seemingly innocuous moral principle - "if we can save a 
human life at minor cost [to ourselves], we are obligated to do so," id. at 3 -when the conse-
quences of applying that principle on a wide social scale are recognized. 
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had little chance to develop their talents or to acquire the appropri-
ate qualifications. Hence the second part of the liberal conception of 
equal opportunity is equality of life chances. The third part of the 
trilemma is not so much a standard liberal principle as a belief that 
Fishkin thinks is held by most people in our society: "the autonomy 
of the family - permitting parents to substantially influence the de-
velopment of their children . . ." (p. 5). 
Fishkin maintains that we can have a merit system and see that 
everyone has equal life chances (the two components of equal oppor-
tunity) - but only if we are willing to grossly interfere with how 
parents raise their children, thus compromising family autonomy to 
a great degree. And we can maintain both family autonomy and the 
merit system - but only if we forgo the ideal of equality of life 
chances, since some children will have a much better chance of hav-
ing their talents developed than will other children. Finally, we can 
maintain both family autonomy and equality of life chances - but 
only if we give up the merit system and substitute a system of ran-
dom allocation of jobs, so that parents are free to raise their children 
as they wish but without their children's life chances being thereby 
influenced. 
Fishkin believes that we should be surprised by the fact that lib-
erty and equality conflict in this way. He thinks it is surprising for 
two reasons, which, taken together, make this conflict potentially 
quite damaging to liberalism. First, consider what must be 
equalized: 
It has long been a theme of libertarians that equality of outcomes could 
be maintained only at a substantial cost in liberty. It is more surpris-
ing, however, that even the apparently less drastic process principles of 
equal opportunity produce the same conflict. Once the role of the fam-
ily is accounted for, the conflict between liberty and equality becomes 
an unavoidable problem at the core of liberal theory. [P. 132].3 
In other words, it is widely known that a high cost in personal liberty 
would have to be paid in order to arrive at and to maintain a society 
in which everyone actually had equal positions (regarding status, 
jobs, income, etc.). Fishkin, however, thinks that it has not been 
generally recognized that an intolerably large degree of liberty -
that is now taken for granted - would have to be forfeited even if 
the demand for equality were lessened to having everyone partici-
pate in "a fair competition . . . for unequal positions in society'' (p. 
1), which is the traditional liberal ideal of equal opportunity. He 
concludes that "the apparently more modest process equalities con-
sidered here, if taken seriously, pose conflicts with liberty that are 
equally [as] stark and unavoidable" (p. 169) as the .conflicts with 
3. See Fishkin's discussion, pp. 133-40, of the libertarian views of Robert Nozick as 
presented in ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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equality of outcomes. Rather than being bland, the liberal ideal of 
equal opportunity is "a startlingly radical idea" (pp. 106-07, empha-
sis added). Equal opportunity is "radical" because its full imple-
mentation would require fundamental changes in family life. 
Second, Fishkin considers it surprising that this particular con-
flict between liberty and equality still arises for liberal theory when 
we presuppose the most favorable situation that can reasonably be 
imagined for a modem, industrial society. Following John Rawls,4 
he specifies two features of "ideal theory." The first ideal assump-
tion that Fishkin makes is that, while families will occupy different 
socioeconomic levels, there will be only "moderate scarcity" in the 
society as a whole.5 The second feature of the realistically ideal soci-
ety is ''strict compliance." That is, it is assumed that the two princi-
ples of equal opportunity are currently complied with - with "good 
will, cooperation, and conscientious agreement" (p. 46) on how to 
implement them - and, furthermore, that these principles have been 
complied with in that society's recent history (so that issues of com-
pensatory justice do not arise). 
Fishkin's point in focusing on "ideal theory" is to underscore the 
seriousness of the purported conflict in liberal theory: 
It would be less surprising if one or more of our central assumptions 
had to be sacrificed under unfavorable conditions where extreme scar-
city, lack of compliance, or a historical legacy to injustice made any 
particular principle difficult to implement. My argument, rather, is 
that under the best conditions that might realistically be imagined for a 
large-scale industrial society, this trilemma arises. In this sense, the 
basic liberal approach to equal opportunity does not amount to a co-
herent ideal once complications involving the family are systematically 
taken into account. [P. 6]. 
Fishkin claims, in sum, that to accept that there will inevitably be 
conflict between the two liberal principles of equal opportunity and 
a commonly agreed-upon degree of personal liberty (involving the 
family) - even assuming the best circumstances realistically avail-
able - is "to admit that liberalism can only offer a seriously tar-
nished and compromised ideal for public policy" (p. 8). If these 
three commitments which liberals make come into conflict with each 
other, the world cannot be blamed; and, since the conflict is not acci-
dental and will never simply go away, liberals are obliged to come 
up with specific solutions. 
Although Fishkin concentrates on the trilemma of merit, equality 
of life chances, and family autonomy, he sees that conflict as a single 
4. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
5. By "moderate scarcity'' Fishkin means two things: (a) "conditions well beyond subsis-
tence are possible for everyone in the society"; and (b) there is a "realistic budget constraint" 
such that "legitimate" demands for national defense, health care, etc., cannot all be met be-
cause resources are limited. P. 45. 
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instance of a more general pattern - making his claims potentially 
even more disruptive to liberal theory. "The essential core of con-
temporary liberalism can be thought of as a series of process equali-
ties - institutionalized practices designed to guarantee equal 
consideration of everyone's preferences or interests" (p. 158). In ad-
dition to equal job opportunities, the other process equalities that 
Fishkin examines are political equality, equality before the law, and 
nationalized health care (pp. 158-69). 
These other trilemmas have the following structure. Equal access 
to the political, legal, and health care systems can be maintained 
only if people are unable to secure unfair advantages - for example, 
as a result of having a higher socioeconomic status. But the rich and 
powerful will generally have more oppo~unities to have their voices 
heard in the political arena, to use the legal system to their advan-
tage (e.g. , through retaining better lawyers), and to procure better 
medical treatment than would the poor. Yes, there are ways of effec-
tively implementing these processes that attempt to put the competi-
tion for the basic requirements of a good life on a fair and equal 
footing. But, Fishkin claims, the degree of liberty that would have to 
be sacrificed in order to insulate these procedures from the usual 
consequences of inequities in money and status would be regarded 
as intolerable by most people. (He mentions the alternate strategy of 
eliminating the background inequities that are disrupting the equal 
access procedures; but he correctly maintains that the cost in liberty 
would then undoubtedly be much greater than the cost of merely 
insulating these procedures from existing inequities (p. 168).) 
Fishkin's conclusion regarding all of these trilemmas is that liber-
als cannot simultaneously make full commitments to the following 
three things. First is the commitment to a procedure designed to 
guarantee equal access to jobs (based on merit), or to the ·political, 
legal or health care systems. The second commitment concerns insu-
lating that procedure from the inequalities in socio-economic status 
that are assumed to exist in societies in which unequal outcomes are 
permitted. Such insulation requires that the rich and powerful be 
prevented from using their general advantages to give themselves 
and their children a competitive advantage when the procedure (the 
first commitment) is applied. The principle of equality of life 
chances, for example, insulates the process of selecting job candi-
dates based on merit. The third commitment is to a generally ac-
cepted degree of liberty regarding family autonomy, freedom of 
speech and association, and freedom to contract for superior legal 
and medical services. 
At the end of the book, Fishkin explains that there is a deficiency 
in liberal methodology, and not only in liberal principles. After ex-
amining recent attempts by liberal theorists to justify their principles 
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of justice, he concludes that, no matter whether the metaethical justi-
fication of specific normative principles is deductive or inductive or 
both,6 that justification will inevitably be "inconclusive." While this 
inconclusiveness, according to Fishkin, does not mean that liberal 
theory must be reduced to subjectivism, he argues that it can do no 
better than advance "conflicting prima facie principles, to be traded 
off in particular cases" (p. 192).7 The resulting "honest but limited 
liberalism" 
is at an ideological disadvantage compared to many of its competitors. 
It affirms a plurality of conflicting [prima facie] principles without ad-
ding up to a single ideal or unified vision for the organization of insti-
tutions in a just society. It lacks a unified program because it lacks any 
general priority relations among its conflicting parts. How its princi-
ples are to be balanced remains an open question, to be faced in partic-
ular cases as they present themselves. . . . [I]t offers us no single vision 
of social justice in clear focus. [P. 193]. 
The force of the trilemmas against liberalism amounts, then, to 
this: Liberals cannot fully realize the three principles of each 
trilemma if these principles are understood to apply without excep-
tions constantly being made on an intuitive basis. Either one or 
more of the principles must be modified - thereby sacrificing ac-
cepted liberal standards of liberty or equality - or else liberals must 
accept that these principles, as they stand (without priority principles 
to resolve conflicts among them), represent a disturbingly incomplete 
ideal. In either case, he urges, liberals should waste no time in mak-
ing the difficult decisions that will point public policy in a single, 
clear-cut direction. 
Having set forth the structure of Fishkin's argument, I shall now 
examine the principles of the main trilemma more closely, and then 
6. A deductive metaethical justification would begin with a method (e.g., Rawls' "Original 
Position") of arriving at normative principles from which specific normative principles would 
be deduced. In contrast, an inductive justification would arrive at specific normative principles 
by generalizing from judgments about specific cases. Deductive methods are inconclusive, 
Fishkin maintains, because there will always be disputes about the specific features of the 
proposed method, and because a better procedure might be devised in the future. Pp. 182-83. 
However, inductive methods are also inconclusive, because the principles arrived at by genera• 
lizing from past cases might not yield correct answers when applied to novel cases. This uncer-
tainty arises because the addition of even one new feature to a situation can completely change 
what the morally correct action would be, and we can never be sure that we have foreseen all 
the possible combinations of all the morally relevant features. Pp. 186-89. The foreseeability 
problem remains even if it is granted, for the sake of argument, that the moral judges - upon 
whose particular decisions the inductive principles are based - are "perfectly unbiased and 
competent." P. 186. 
7. Fishkin maintains, however, that most liberals regard their principles (as established) as 
being exceptionless. He also claims that most liberals believe it to be impossible on rational 
grounds to question whether their principles are correct. Pp. 170-71. I find the latter claim 
odd indeed, since liberalism traditionally upholds the right of free speech, in large measure, 
because one cannot be absolutely certain that one's views are perfectly correct. 
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assess the overall significance of his critique of liberal views on social 
justice. 
II. FAMILY AUTONOMY 
For Fisbkin, liberty, like charity, begins at home - with family 
autonomy. His concept of family autonomy deserves careful atten-
tion so that his main claim about the conflict between family auton-
omy and the liberal ideal of equal opportunity can be evaluated. His 
full definition of this concept is: 
AUTONOMY OF THE FAMILY: Consensual relations within a given 
family governing the development of its children should not be coercively 
interfered with [by the state] except to ensure for the children the essen-
tial prerequisites/or adult participation in the society. [Pp. 35-36].8 
"Essential prerequisites," we are told, refer to ''the physical and psy-
chological health of the child and his or her knowledge of those so-
cial conventions necessary for participation in adult society" (p. 36), 
including being literate. Family autonomy, as Fisbkin defines it, is 
equivalent to parental autonomy: parents should be able to do what 
they want with their children, without outside interference, as long 
as the children are not thereby harmed. More specifically, he speaks 
of family autonomy in terms of parents wanting to secure the devel-
opment of their children's talents and to insure that their children 
develop those qualifications which are prerequistes to obtaining and 
holding down good jobs. Those qualifications would presumably in-
clude the skills of writing and speaking, social skills, and the charac-
ter traits of perseverance and assertiveness, in addition to any skills 
or knowledge related to a specific profession. Fisbkin deliberately 
limits family autonomy to as narrow and noncontroversial an area as 
possible so that the eventual trilemma will have the maximum 
amount of force. He thus excludes from his discussion families in 
which there are custody disputes ( disputes about who the members 
of the family are) and in which the parents disagree about child-
raising practices (p. 36).9 
Since the fundamental conflict addressed by Fisbkin is between 
equality and liberty, it might be wondered why he concentrates on 
family autonomy instead of on the more standard individual liberty. 
For, as he is fully aware (p. 43), if the commitment to equal opportu-
nity conflicts with seeking advantages for one's own children (for 
example, in obtaining admission to law school), then that commit-
ment would also conflict with seeking advantages for oneself. 
8. For Fishkin, a family may be headed by a single parent or by a homosexual couple, but 
there must be at least one child. P. 36. 
9. In order to be noncontroversial, he also excludes some things that would obviously con-
flict with the merit principle: "[F]amily autonomy is not meant to govern job assignments in 
adult society. It should not be construed to protect nepotism, the buying of positions, or large-
scale inheritance." P. 37. 
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Fishkin offers two reasons for focusing onfami!y autonomy. First, 
he sees his interpretation of family autonomy as a value held by 
most members of our society, not only by liberals. It is "our custom-
ary commitment" (p. 106), a part of "conventional morality" (p. 43), 
and it represents "the way of life we commonly take for granted" (p. 
107). Second, he views liberals, in particular, as committed to family 
autonomy because of their specific theoretical commitment to John 
Stuart Mill's private sphere of "self-regarding" actions. Mill held, in 
On Liberty, that actions should be immune from interference both 
by other individuals and by the state when those actions affect only 
oneself or other adults who have voluntarily consented to be in-
volved, or when there is no highly probable risk of a significant 
amount of direct harm to specifiable other individuals. As Fishkin 
notes (p. 40), although Mill's basic principle refers to persons "in the 
maturity of their faculties," Mill specifically requires parents to re-
strict their children's liberty for the latter's own good (in certain re-
spects); and if the parents neglect this duty, then the state is justified 
in stepping in. Thus, Fishkin focuses on family autonomy both be-
cause the liberal conception of liberty requires such commitment, 
and because he sees equal opportunity as conflicting most obviously 
and directly with that aspect of "the sphere of liberty most precious 
to the way most-of us live" (p. 145). 
Fishkin usefully points out (pp. 154-57) that Rawls - although 
aware of the conflict between his principles of justice and common 
assumptions about the family - makes no attempt to resolve that 
conflict. Moreover, it is undoubtedly true that virtually all liberals 
would subscribe to some version of family autonomy, if only to dis-
allow taking children from their natural parents whenever someone 
else could raise them better. Still, we may question whether family 
autonomy, as defined by Fishkin, is an obvious moral right to be 
protected as part of the private sphere of individual liberty. In an-
swering this question, we should distinguish between two senses of 
being free to raise one's children as one sees fit. We may mean, first, 
being free to help one's children develop as full human beings. State 
interference with such a goal may legitimately be seen as signifi-
cantly harmful to those children, and thus as being morally imper-
missible. Second, we may mean giving one's children a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace, in the hope that they will beat out 
others in securing a good education, a well-paying job, and high so-
cial status. 
Fishkin may be assuming that one has a moral right to see that 
one's children develop as persons, and I would agree (although even 
here I would add some qualifications).10 A liberal might reasonably 
IO. Even helping one's children to develop fully as human beings must be restricted to 
some degree. Otherwise, this liberty could be so widely construed that it would include ensur-
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feel, however, that it is far from clear that one has an unrestricted 
moral right to give one's children a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. Indeed, such an unrestricted right would preclude a 
commitment to equal opportunity for all. Most liberals would claim, 
I think, that one has a moral right to give one's children a competi-
tive advantage only !f the competition were fair - that is, only if the 
other competitors had a reasonable opportunity to secure the same 
skills and knowledge and the evaluation criteria were themselves 
fair. While Fishkill nowhere explicitly states that family autonomy 
includes the moral right of parents to gain for their children an un-
fair advantage in the competition for jobs, he nowhere distinguishes 
between enabling one's children to develop as human beings and 
enabling them to beat out the competition.11 Hence he allows our 
positive moral evaluation of the former goal to extend to the latter 
goal; and an unrestricted commitment to enabling one's children to 
win competitions for jobs (assuming that one extends this right to all 
parents) is, it is true, utterly inconsistent with a commitment to equal 
opportunity. 
Liberals could, however, consistently believe in equal opportu-
nity for all and in a reasonable interpretation of family autonomy. 
Such an interpretation might be stated as follows: 
MY MODIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FAMILY AU-
TONOMY: Parents are entitled to encourage their children's basic de-
velopment as human beings without interference by the state (unless the 
parents are compromising the essential well-being of the child). However, 
parents are not entitled to seek a competitive advantage for their children 
when their children's competitors for jobs have had no reasonable chance 
at developing their talents or of obtaining the necessary qualffecations -
unless those parents have put a non-trivial amount of ejfort into trying to 
help the children of the disadvantaged to obtain a fair chance at compel-
ing the acquisition by one's children of countless skills, the knowledge represented by several 
graduate degrees, and many years of work experience; and then the distinction between devel-
oping as a person and acquiring a competitive edge in the marketplace would dissolve. The 
liberty to have one's children develop as persons should be limited to fairly basic attitudes, 
values and skills. Though further specification would be required, a distinction between a per-
son who is a flourishing human being and one who is successful in the world can, I believe, be 
drawn. 
11. For example, Fishkin writes: 
It would be hopelessly unrealistic to expect advantaged parents to consent voluntarily and 
universally to conditions that were explicitly designed to render their children worse off. 
But any effective leveling down strategy [which brings rich children down to the level of 
poor children] would, by definition, have that result. 
P. 80 (footnote omitted). In other words, the family autonomy of rich parents would be re-
stricted if their children were brought down to the level of their competitors. But would such a 
restriction be morally impermissible? The term ''worse ofl'' is ambiguous; children could be 
worse off as human beings, or worse off competitively in the marketplace. It might be "hope-
lessly unrealistic" to expect most rich people voluntarily to refrain from doing all they could to 
ensure that their children would beat out others in competing for jobs. However, one might 
expect rich liberal parents to refrain from seeking unfair competitive advantages for their chil-
dren, if those parents claim to be committed to equal opportunity for all. 
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ing. 12 Moreover, until equal opportunity is achieved, part of encouraging 
one's children's development as human beings will include getting them to 
appreciate that their success in the world results, in part, from the fact 
that many of their competitors (and potential competitors) did not have a 
reasonable chance to compete with them. 
Fishkin may have correctly identified a commonly held view about 
the family - that parents should be allowed to seek the best for their 
children - but I question whether he has captured what reflective 
liberals would claim about parental authority over the development 
of their children. 
I have just suggested a way of modifying family autonomy so 
that it is a principle to which many liberal parents could adhere (al-
though they might not hold it now), yet which is compatible with an 
ideal of equal opportunity that still has some bite in it. My next 
point has less to do with a conflict in ideals than with a divergence 
between ideals and practice. 
In addition to the two plausible reasons (cited above) which 
Fishkin gives for singling out family autonomy from the rest of the 
private sphere of protected actions, another reason, of which he is 
apparently unaware, may be affecting our intuitions about family 
autonomy. If some liberals espouse equal opportunity and also de-
liberately will that their own children not compete on a fair basis 
with other children, those liberals do not simply have conflicting val-
ues without ever realizing it; they are hypocrites - they are trying to 
cheat for their children .13 Perhaps one reason why family autonomy 
may intuitively seem to rest on firmer moral ground than other areas 
of the private sphere is that cheating for one's children may seem to 
many to be more noble than cheating for oneself. The former may 
seem nobler because sacrifices are demanded of parents, such as pay-
ing for an expensive private school or taking the time to read to their 
12. Other exceptions should probably be built into the principle. In particular, if ad-
vantaged parents have worked diligently to achieve some morally worthy goal - even if it is 
unrelated to equal opportunity - that would be enough to make it morally permissible for 
them to try to give their children a competitive edge when they know that others in that com• 
petition have (through no direct fault of the advantaged parents) been denied equal opportu-
nity. What I am trying to do is to disqualify the following as morally permissible: advantaged 
parents, who are aware that the ideal of equal opportunity is not yet realized, doing a great 
deal to give their children a competitive edge while doing nothing to improve the lives of those 
less fortunate - that is, parents who complacently say that because they did not cause the 
original problem they do not have to be part of the solution. 
13. By "cheating" I mean that one seeks to avoid the results of a fair competition (gov-
erned by as much equal opportunity as exists at present) either for oneself or for one's chil-
dren. 
The situation is, of course, more complicated than I have thus far made it out to be. For 
example, one's children may be (and feel) relatively disadvantaged if -compared lo their peers 
and friends of the same race, sex or class-their talents are not as well developed. See Kavka, 
When Two 'Wrongs' Make a Right; An Essay on Business Ethics, 2 J. Bus. ETHICS 61 (1983) 
(discussion of under what {limited) conditions violations of a moral rule are justified because 
others are already violating that rule). 
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young children. While I recognize the seriousness of the decision not 
to give one's children every competitive advantage at one's dispo-
sal, 14 I do not see cheating for one's children as noble; nor, I con-
tend, should liberals who are committed to equal opportunity. 
Details still need to be worked out concerning how much one 
may favor one's own children so that they can more readily attain 
worldly success. (I am assuming that morally one may - indeed 
must -favor them regarding their development as human beings.) 
However, if one is committed to equal opportunity, then one should 
be prepared to accept -for oneself and for one's children-at least 
some of the results of equal opportunity, even if one (or one's chil-
dren) could do better by getting an unfair edge. My modified ver-
sion of family autonomy does not require (indeed it forbids) that the 
children of the advantaged be harmed as persons. It only denies that 
they have an unrestricted moral right to the competitive advantages 
they will receive because equal opportunity is not, in fact, available 
for all. 
Being committed to equal opportunity does preclude looking out 
only for Number 1 and Number l's children. If that is what 
Fishkin's trilemma comes down to, then I wholeheartedly concur 
with him. Being committed to a just society will cost the advantaged 
some of their comparative advantages, though it may cost them none 
of their humanity; in fact, their humanity may be enhanced. In 
wanting the best for their children, liberals often, in fact, look at the 
benefits that are possible only if equal opportunity is realized in soci-
ety, and see the non-zero-sum aspects of human relationships in ad-
dition to the realities of (zero-sum) competition. Where I disagree 
with Fishkin is in his maintaining that family autonomy is actually 
interpreted by liberals to mean that people must be free to act upon 
their desire to not want equal opportunity to apply to them or their 
children. Espousing family autonomy should not give moral license 
to extended selfishness. 
Ill. HAVE LIBERALS BEEN BLIND TO THE FAMILY? 
Fishkin contends that liberals have failed to see how "radical" 
equal opportunity really is because of their ''blindness to the role of 
the family'' (p. 146). To some extent he is quite correct, and I ap-
plaud his attempt to incorporate issues relating to the family into 
political philosophy. Much more thinking and theorizing awaits to 
be done regarding morality and the family. Yet I 'nnd· his claim 
about "blindness" to be much too harsh in the light of the recent 
14. The strength of the desire to give one's children (or, by extension, one's grandchildren 
or one's friend's children) every competitive advantage is aptly described in the aphorism, "a 
liberal is a radical with children; a conservative is a liberal with children." 
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literature on the children's rights, 15 women's rights, and gay rights 
movements. 
Conservatives who claim that they are "pro-family" have made it 
clear that many of this country's traditional views about the family 
(including the notion that it consists of two heterosexual parents, a 
working father as head of the household, and a mother who does not 
work outside the home - unless forced to by economic necessity, in 
which case she still continues to perform all her usual domestic re-
sponsibilities) count against standard liberal ideals. "Pro-family" 
has come to symbolize, for example, opposition to teenage girls ob-
taining contraception without parental permission, as well as opposi-
tion to the Equal Rights Amendment and to according homosexuals 
full civil rights. In so doing it opposes both the ideal of equal oppor-
tunity and, to a significant degree, the Millian private sphere (for 
women, gays, and older minor children) in the name of protecting 
family unity and parental (often the father's) authority over how 
children are to be educated and raised. In contrast, liberals have 
been much more likely to favor restricting parental control over chil-
dren - both to prevent harm to the children (e.g., in cases where, 
on religious grounds, parents refuse potentially life-saving medical 
treatment for their children) and to support the autonomous deci-
sions of older minors. 
So far, Fishkin and I are not far apart. The difference between 
our assessments of how blind liberals have been concerning the fam-
ily could be a matter of degree, of emphasis. However, I am re-
minded oflast autumn, when an audience of N.O.W. members was 
told by John Glenn that ''we" had simply not tried hard enough to 
get the Equal Rights Amendment passed. The two ''we's" -
Glenn's and the audience's - were not the same. When Fishkin 
refers to his interpretation of family autonomy as identifying "the 
core area of negative liberty [Mill's private sphere] that is most cen-
tral to the way most of us have structured our lives," (p. 84) many 
liberals who support the feminist and gay movements may feel left 
out of the group defined by "us." 
The problem is not that many people, for a variety of reasons, do 
not have children, with the result that child-raising is not central to 
their lives. For, those without minor children of their own may feel 
inclined to favor their grandchildren, nieces and nephews, and the 
15. Fishkin explicitly declines to discuss the issue of children's rights. P. 37. He prefers to 
examine families in which parents and children basically cooperate, in order to show that his 
trilemma arises even under ideal conditions. However, the issue of children's rights arises not 
only when children rebel, but also when they do not know enough, or are powerless, to oppose 
their parents. Hence, children's rights apply in "normal" cases, and not only when the family 
is breaking down. On the issue of raising children to be autonomous adults, see Feinberg, The 
Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHOR· 
ITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (W. Aiken & H. LaFollette eds. 1980), and Bishop, Children, 
Autonomy and the Right to Se!fIJeterminalion, in id at 154. 
February 1984] How Radical is Liberalism? 773 
children of their friends in just the way parents do. The problem is 
more fundamental; Fishkin's portrayal of parental authority over 
children as being the least controversial part of personal liberty will 
strike many liberals as odd. 
Fishkin is careful to explicitly include homosexual couples with 
children and single-parent families when defining the family. And 
what he writes does not contradict the main goals of those move-
ments which support the rights of children, gays, and women. Yet 
his assertion that liberals have been blind to the fact that equal op-
portunity would require them to alter dramatically their domestic 
lives suggests some degree of near-sightedness on his part regarding 
how many liberals are already aware that equality begins at home16 
- where it often causes much pain and conflict among the family 
members. 
Consider, for example, the historical situation of women. Their 
autonomy has been severely restricted by their bearing and caring 
for children and,. until recently, their authority to raise their children 
as they saw fit was severely restricted by the authority of their hus-
band over them.17 Most women did not experience either their 
home as their castle or their children as their natural subjects. In-
stead, home was the place wherein it was terribly difficult to find "a 
room of one's own."18 Without question, there are many liberals 
16. For example, truly giving "equal pay for equal work" (or-somewhat more radically, 
but still in keeping with the liberal ideal of equal opportunity - equal pay for work requiring 
comparable training, skills and effort) would dramatically affect the family structure, not to 
mention its large-scale effects on the economy generally. 
17. See Carl N. Degler's comprehensive historical account relating the situation of women 
with the traditional view of the family, in AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980). His main thesis is that "the equality of 
women and the institution of the family have long been at odds with each other. • . . [T]he 
family's existence assumes that a woman will subordinate her individual interest to those of 
others - the members of her family." Pp. vi-vii. 
18. See V. WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (1929). 
Considering the extensive footnotes that Fishkin gives us on most aspects of political phi-
losophy, it is curious that he refers to no sources on gay rights and that only two recent books 
on women's rights are discussed (in brief footnotes). Even when he refers, p. 65 n.38, to Susan 
Moller Okin's WOMEN IN WESTERN PoLmCAL THOUGHT (1979), he mentions her discussion 
of Plato's views on child-raising and the family without calling attention to her critique of 
Mill's essay on The Subjection of Women, in EsSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 125 (A. Rossi ed. 
1970). Okin concludes her chapter on Mill as follows: 
although a very forward-looking feminist in many respects, he in no way perceived the 
injustice involved in institutions and practices which allowed a man to have a career and 
economic independence, and a home life and children, but which forced a woman to 
choose between the two. His refusal to question the traditional family and its,demands on 
women set the limits of his liberal feminism. 
S. OKIN,mpra, at 230 (emphasis in original). Among those feminist works which consider the 
issue of the family are N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALY-
SIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978), and B. FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE (1981). 
See generally SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1975 - ), a periodical 
which frequently publishes reviews surveying the recent literature relevant to women's issues 
within a variety of academic disciplines. 
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who are in need of hearing Fishkin's message about how social 
equality would require fundamental changes in traditional family 
life. But he would have done better to explicitly address different 
groups of liberals, since the "we liberals" to whom he addresses his 
message is far from all-inclusive. 
IV. PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND THE MERIT PRINCIPLE 
A good portion of the book (pp. 55-64, 82-105, 108-31, 149-50) is 
spent discussing the issue of preferential hiring and admissions. 
Fishkin provides a clearly stated survey of the main moral argu-
ments on both sides of the debate, as well as a careful philosophical 
analysis of those arguments. The .DeFunis19 and .Bakke20 cases 
(along with secondary literature on them) are singled out for special 
treatment. He handles this controversial subject in an extremely 
thorough and fair-minded way, raising and answering many inter-
esting objections to his own arguments in the process. 
Fishkin considers preferential hiring and admission within the 
context of his main trilemma of merit selection, equal life chances, 
and family autonomy. He focuses upon those instances of preferen-
tial treatment - or reverse discrimination - that produce "signifi-
cant and widespread sacrifice of the principle of merit in assignment 
[of jobs or places in school] in order to favor some specified group 
defined in terms of arbitrary native characteristics (such as race, sex, 
or family background)" (p. 87). He considers two distinct moral jus-
tifications that are often offered for such preference: (a) to equalize 
the life chances of those whose opportunity to develop their talents 
and to acquire job qualifications was severely restricted (but where 
limited opportunities were not necessarily caused by past injustices), 
and (b) to compensate for past discrimination, that is, for past viola-
tions of the merit principle. In contrast to other parts of the book, 
Fishkin does not limit his attention here to ideal theory ( as witnessed 
by his consideration of compensation for past injustices). He pro-
ceeds by stipulating the following minimum condition ( on the ground 
that it "seems reasonable" - which it does): 
[N]o sacrifice in one of these three central principles [merit, equal life 
chances, and family autonomy] should be undertaken unless the sacri-
fice is necessary for a gain in one or more of the other two, or unless 
there is some other valuable gain (according to other principles that 
would then have to be argued for, in tum). [P. 84, emphasis in 
original]. 
Fishkin examines various arguments in favor of considering racial 
and ethnic minorities as groups21 - for example, preferentially ad-
19. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
20. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 26S (1978). 
21. See especially Fishkin's critique of two arguments in favor of preferential treatment: 
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mitting the most qualified members of disadvantaged groups to law 
school, even though these individuals may have suffered little them-
selves. Based on the above minimum condition, he holds that the 
merit principle should not be compromised unless the life chances of 
affected individuals are made more nearly equal (pp. 104-05). 
Hence he concludes that preferential treatment must be specifically 
targeted either (a) at those who actually had the development of 
their talents severely curtailed or (b) at those who actually suffered 
the effects of past discrimination. 
Fishkill handles the issue of preferential treatment quite well, 
and I have but two criticisms of it. First, he mentions the need to 
raise the aspirations of disadvantaged minorities and to supply them 
with role models (pp. 94-95, 105), only to immediately dismiss these 
factors as minor, appealing directly to our intuitions without supply-
ing any empirical evidence. Though he gives a much fuller discus-
sion of members of disadvantaged groups who identify with the 
group as a whole,22 I would have preferred that he take more seri-
ously the many psychological effects which, for example, blacks in 
this country still suffer as blacks even when they are materially well 
off. Second, his account of preferential treatment hardly deals with 
women at all. The literature on this topic, and on sexism in general, 
explores in some depth the psychological effects of sexism even on 
women who are middle- or upper-class, or who have careers.23 
Fishkill, however, concentrates only on racial minorities. 
V. EQUALITY OF LIFE CHANCES: HAVING A NOT IMPOSSIBLE 
DREAM 
Having previously questioned (in Part II) whether Fiskin's ver-
sion of family autonomy is an interpretation held by most liberals, I 
will now ask whether most liberals would subscribe to his interpreta-
tion of another "horn" of his main trilemma: equality of life chances. 
Recall that Fishkill regards it as surprising that liberty conflicts not 
the view that compensation for past discrimination is owed to certain entire groups, rather 
than to individuals specifically affected, because all group members identify with the group as a 
whole, pp. I 13-26; and the view (which is not based on compensatory justice) that preference is 
necessary to eliminate a "persisting racial underclass" or "caste," pp. 127-31. 
22. See note 21 supra. 
23. Sees. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 641-72 (H.M. Parshley trans. 1968) and M.A. 
Warren, Secondary Sexism and Quota Hiring, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 240 (1977). · 
Despite the fact that Fishkin's discussion of preferential treatment concentrates almost en-
tirely on racial and ethnic minorities, he makes the following perceptive point about how giv-
ing preference to women as a group is quite different from giving:'.' preference to racial 
minorities as groups: 
Perhaps I am far worse-off now than I would otherwise have been, because my grand-
mother was discriminated against because she was a woman. It is clearly possible . . . 
[that] I would be better-off if she had not been discriminated against, even though I do not 
share the characteristic that singled her out for discrimination, namely, her sex. 
P. 99. 
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only with equality of outcomes (as libertarians have demonstrated), 
but also with the lesser requirement of equal opportunity (pp. 3, 
132). Our surprise is lessened, however, once we closely examine his 
account of equality of life chances. For, in several places, he main-
tains that equality of outcomes across groups is the practical test or 
criterion of individuals having been raised with equal life chances. 
Fishkin explains equality of life chances in his introductory 
chapter: 
According to this notion, I should not be able to enter a hospital ward 
of healthy newborn babies and, on the basis of class, race, sex, or other 
arbitrary native characteristics, predict the eventual positions in society 
of those children. [P. 4].24 
If one can predict where people will end up in the competition merely 
by knowing their race or sex or family background, then the conditions 
under which their talents and motivations have developed must be 
grossly unequal. It is unfair that some persons are given every conceiv-
able advantage while others never really have a chance, in the first 
place, to develop their talents. The principle of equal life chances, 
when combined with the principle of merit, would require equal devel-
opmental conditions for talent development. [P. 5]. 
The problem is that in the above two passages and elsewhere in the 
book, Fishkin runs together several quite distinct conceptions of 
what equality of life chances involves. 
Fishkin's first interpretation of the equality principle is that if 
one's income, status and occupation (that is, the outcome) can be 
predicted based on the arbitrary characteristics of one's group (race, 
class or sex), then we must inf er that the chances that individuals in 
these different groups had for developing their talents and skills is 
"grossly'' (p. 5) or "unacceptably" (p. 31) unequal. 
His second interpretation is that it is unfair if some (but not all) 
competitors "never had a chance" to develop their talents and 
skills.25 The contradictory of "never having had a chance" is having 
had some chance -what Fishkin elsewhere calls a "suitable" (p. 31) 
or "appropriate" (p. 20) chance, and what I would call a reasonable 
chance, a not impossible dream. Notice that this second interpreta-
tion of equality of life chances is much weaker than the first. To tell 
whether a chance is reasonable, the probability that one will succeed 
24. Fishkin offers a good definition of this slippery term: "A native characteristic will be 
considered arbitrary unless it predicts the development of qualifications to a high degree 
among children who have been subjected to equal developmental conditions." P. 32 (footnote 
omitted). 
25. Fishkin also relates this idea - that it is unfair if a person never had a chance to 
compete on an equal footing - to the merit principle. He claims that it would be "manifestly 
unfair" if one's qualifications for a job were evaluated according to how members of one's 
group (with whom one shares arbitrary characteristics) tend to perform because, regardless of 
one's "own past or present actual performance of relevant tasks," one "would never have had a 
chance to compete, to prove [one's] own competence." P. 24 (emphasis in original). 
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- based on arbitrary characteristics - must not be too low (how-
ever that is operationally defined). Under this second view, how-
ever, that probability does not have to be as high as the success 
predicted for members of all other groups. As the unemployment 
rate for black teenagers approaches fifty percent, one would say that 
a black teenager's chance for getting a good job is not a reasonable 
one. But, on the second view, the unemployment rate for black teen-
agers need not be the same as for white teenagers in order to give the 
latter group a fair chance to compete. 
Fishkin's third interpretation is that equality of life chances re-
quires "equal developmental conditions for talent development" (p. 
5). Elsewhere he softens that slightly to say that "the causal condi-
tions for talent development [should be] substantially equalized 
across all sectors of society" (p. 20). And his formal statement of the 
principle of equality of life chances is a version of his third interpre-
tation. "The prospects of children for eventual positions in society 
should not vary in any systematic and significant manner with their 
arbitrary native characteristics" (p. 32, emphasis omitted). This 
third view is clearly much stronger than the second, which requires 
only a reasonable minimum for everyone's development of talents 
and allows for some people having much greater opportunities than 
others. The third view is also stronger than the first, which claimed 
that "grossly" unequal developmental conditions were unfair; for, 
under the third view, smaller disparities in developmental conditions 
seem also to be "unacceptable." 
I maintain that the second view captures what most (but not all) 
liberals would embrace: everyone's life chances should be raised to 
some reasonable minimnm level. That is, the focus should be on 
ensuring that no one's dreams are impossible, instead of on enabling 
everyone to have equally possible dreams. And while predictability 
of grossly different outcomes across groups (the first interpretation) 
might lead us to infer that some people had no real chance of success 
at all (the second interpretation), we might not require that (nearly) 
equal outcomes be predictable (the third interpretation).26 
The "incoherence" which Fishkin discovers in liberal theory 
amounts to this. If liberals are really committed to process equalities 
(for example, merit selection), then there must be (nearly) equal out-
comes, on average, for groups that are differentiated only by charac-
teristics unrelated to job performance. His reason is that the 
existence of unequal outcomes proves that the process equalities 
were not fully insulated from unequal background conditions. But if 
that is Fishkin's argument, it amounts to saying that liberals who 
26. Note that while predictability of outcomes should make us extremely suspicious that 
developmental conditions were unfair, predictability, in itself, is at most a useful criterion of 
whether the outcome was arrived at fairly; it does not itself define a fair procedure. 
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believe in process equalities are, whether they realize it or not, com-
mitted to equal outcomes - and, as we already knew, requiring 
equal outcomes involves a great degree of interference with liberty. 
The issue is whether liberals can still commit themselves to a version 
of equal opportunity (and, more specifically, of equality of life 
chances) that is both a robust, morally worthy goal and that does not 
require equal outcomes. 
It is clear from Fishkin's description of the other trilemmas that 
he assumes that the liberal goal is full equalization (that is, equal 
outcomes). For example, he holds that equal access to medical care 
requires that the rich should not be able to buy better medical care 
than the poor (p. 168) - rather than simply ensuring that the poor 
have adequate medical care. Perhaps this is the point where "ideal 
theory'' gets in Fishkin's way. It is probably true that almost all lib-
erals would ideally prefer a society in which members of all groups 
could be expected, on average, to have equal outcomes; that is, they 
would prefer a society in which all people's dreams were equally 
possible. But drawing inspiration from such a utopia does not neces-
sarily mean that one will commit oneself to realizing that ideal in the 
present. 
If Fishkin does equivocate between merely insulating process 
equalities from the most stultifying effects of poverty and racism, 
and requiring equal outcomes for all groups as a criterion that the 
process was insulated, he is not the only one. The two prima facie 
standards courts recognize under title VII - "disparate treatment" 
and "disparate impact"27 - reflect a similar equivocation. But even 
the latter doctrine does not commit us to equal outcomes, as it does 
not apply to performance-related employment criteria that may cor-
relate with race due to discrimination in other areas. 28 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Several groups of people would benefit from reading Justice, 
Equal Opportunity, and the Family. First, the book would be useful 
for those who desire a clear and thoughtful examination of liberal 
views on the issue of equal opportunity (including a well-argued 
analysis of the morality of preferential hiring and admissions, featur-
ing the .DeFunis and Bakke cases). Second, it would benefit those 
who want a comprehensive overview of the contemporary literature 
in political philosophy. And third, it would serve liberals who are 
concerned with pinpointing the conflicts within liberal ideals in or-
der that more specific guidelines for public policy may be devised. 
27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
28. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
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The strong points of Fisbkin's book are many. He raises provoc-
ative issues, locates them within a broader theoretical framework, 
and demonstrates an urgent need for liberals to set certain priorities. 
His main message - that liberalism has radical implications for or-
dinary life - needs to be heard by many. In particular, moral issues 
relating to the family require an on-going debate.29 Some liberal 
theorists, such as Rawls, need to show how family autonomy and 
social justice are to be wedded. More concretely, the conflict which 
Fisbkin points to between (parental) autonomy, on the one hand, 
and a conception of social justice that seeks to alleviate human suf-
fering, on the other hand, is an instance of a larger problem with 
which liberalism has not yet fully come to grips: how to help people 
in need without undermining - indeed, furthering if possible -
their capacity for autonomous choice. 
The book has two principal shortcomings. First, not all of the 
weaknesses Fisbkin finds in liberalism are unique to liberalism. For 
example, if some liberals offer prima facie principles with little gui-
dance about how these principles are to be weighed against each 
other in specific cases, many of the adherents of the other political 
perspectives also fail to specify their priorities. And although he is 
correct that liberal theory lacks an absolutely certain method of es-
tablishing its basic principles (pp. 169-93), no metaethical system has 
the guarantees he requires; one can always question whether a 
method of justification is sound. Second, he might have done more 
in the way of offering solutions to the trilemma.30 . In particular, it 
would have been useful if he had identified a variety of possible lib-
eral interpretations of the principles of merit, equality of life 
chances, and family autonomy. I have maintained that many liber-
als already hold weakened versions of these principles (for example, 
by requiring that everyone have a reasonable 
0
chance of competing 
for jobs, but not necessarily the same chance), or else I have sug-
gested specific ways in which these principles could be made consis-
tent (for example, by modifying family autonomy so that parents are 
quite free to encourage their children's growth as human beings but 
are not free to give their children every competitive advantage in 
pursuing jobs). If Fisbkin had distinguished among versions of the 
29. Moral and political philosophy are only recently coming to grips with many of the 
moral concerns that face family members - by asking, for example, what responsibilities 
grown children have for their parents. See J. BLUSTEIN, PARENTS ANO CHILDREN: THE ETH-
ICS OF THE FAMILY (1982); HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON 
PARENTHOOD (1979). 
30. He does discuss some ways out of the tri1e=a. However, the two main alternatives he 
discusses (in addition to preferential hiring, which compromises the merit principle) are com-
pletely sacrificing merit by assigning jobs via a lottery, and giving up the principle of equal life 
chances in favor of the principle of equal outcomes. Pp. 110-13, 131-46. Neither of these two 
alternatives, however, suggests the specific compromises that are needed to make the three 
components of the tri1e=a consistent. 
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three trilemmic principles, the distinction would have helped us in 
evaluating different conceptions of liberalism. Instead of focusing 
on solutions, however, he prefers to demonstrate how urgently solu-
tions are needed if liberalism is to be compelling and complete. 
